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Understanding the link between international trade and aggregate productivity is one of the
major challenges in international economics. To learn more about this link at the microeco-
nomic level, a recent literature explores the eect of imported inputs|which constitute the
majority of world trade|on rm productivity. Studies show that improved access to foreign
inputs has increased rm productivity in several countries, including Indonesia (Amiti and
Konings 2007), Chile (Kasahara and Rodrigue 2008) and India (Topalova and Khandelwal
2011).1 The next step in this research agenda is to investigate the underlying mechanism
through which imports increase productivity. As Hallak and Levinsohn (2008) emphasize,
understanding which rms gain most, through what channel, and how the eect depends
on the economic environment, are important for evaluating the welfare and redistributive
implications of trade policies.
To explore these questions, in this paper we estimate a structural model of importer rms
in Hungarian rm level data, and conduct counterfactual policy analysis in our estimated
economy. Our starting point is a unique dataset that contains detailed information on im-
ported goods for essentially all Hungarian manufacturing rms during 1992-2003. Motivated
by stylized facts in these data, we formulate a model of rms who use dierentiated inputs
to produce a nal good and must pay a xed cost for each variety they choose to import.
Imported inputs aect rm productivity through two distinct channels emphasized in the
literature: they have a potentially higher price-adjusted quality as in quality-ladder models,
and they imperfectly substitute domestic inputs as in product-variety models.2 Because of
these forces, rm productivity increases in the number of varieties imported. Our model also
permits rich heterogeneity across products and rms.
In the rst half of the paper we estimate this model in micro data. In doing so, we
face the key empirical challenge that imports are chosen endogenously by the rm. We deal
with this identication problem using a structural approach which exploits the product-level
nature of the data. Our model implies a rm-level production function in which output
depends on the usual factors of production as well as a new term related to the number of
imported varieties. To estimate this production function, we follow Olley and Pakes (1996)
in nonparametrically controlling for rm investment and other state variables, which pick up
the unobserved component of productivity under standard assumptions. The import eect
1Results are con
icting for Brazil: Schor (2004) estimates a positive eect while Muendler (2004) nds
no eect of imported inputs on productivity.
2For quality-ladder models see Aghion and Howitt (1992) or Grossman and Helpman (1991). Variety
eects are introduced in Ethier (1982).
1is then identied from residual variation in the number of imported varieties. Intuitively,
we estimate the dierence in output between two rms that have the same productivity,
but dier in the number of varieties they choose to import|which, according to our model,
happens because they face a dierent xed cost of importing. We nd substantial gains
from imported inputs: in the baseline specication, increasing the fraction of tradeable
goods imported by a rm from 0 to 100 percent would increase productivity by 12 percent.
We then turn to decompose the import eect into dierences in quality and imperfect
substitution. We rst note that for a given productivity gain from importing a particular
good, the degree of substitution governs a rm's expenditure share of foreign versus domestic
purchases. For example, when foreign and domestic inputs are close to perfect substitutes,
even if the productivity gain from imports is small the import share should be high.3 Based
on this idea, we then infer the relative magnitude of the two channels by comparing the
expenditure share of imports for rms who dier in the number of imported varieties. While
quality eects are important, we nd that combining imperfectly substitutable foreign and
domestic varieties is responsible for a substantial part|almost 40 percent|of the productiv-
ity gain from imports. This nding parallels the evidence in Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik
and Topalova (2009) that combining foreign and domestic varieties increased rms' product
scope in India; and also the theoretical arguments of Hirschman (1958), Kremer (1993) and
Jones (2011) that complementarities, which amplify dierences in input quality, may help
explain large cross-country income dierences.
We next explore whether the benets from importing dier between foreign and domestic
rms. Intuitively, because they have know-how about foreign markets and can access cheap
suppliers abroad, foreign companies may gain more from spending on imports. This is an
important possibility because foreign rms have played a very signicant role in Hungary:
during 1992-2003, their sales share in our data increased from 21 percent to 77 percent. When
we re-estimate our model allowing for dierences in the eciency of import use by ownership
status, we nd that foreign companies benet about 27 percent more than domestic ones
from each dollar they spend on imports. To explore whether this large dierence is directly
caused by foreign ownership and not by selection, we use an event study in the subsample
of initially domestic companies which were subsequently purchased by foreign investors. We
nd that the eectiveness of import use increases by 13.5 percent after a company changes
owners (p-value of 9.9%), providing suggestive evidence|in a relatively small sample|that
3This link between import demand and the role of complementarities is also exploited by Feenstra (1994),
Broda and Weinstein (2006) and Broda, Greeneld and Weinstein (2006) in country level data.
2at least part of the advantage of foreign rms is caused by them being foreign-owned, and
implying a complementarity between foreign presence and importing.
In the second half of the paper, we study the economic and policy implications of our
estimates in two applications. We rst quantify the contribution of imports to productivity
growth in Hungary during 1993-2002. Our estimates imply a productivity gain of 15 percent
in the Hungarian manufacturing sector, of which 6 percentage points, more than a third,
can be attributed to import-related mechanisms. Approximately half of these import-related
gains are due to the increased volume and number of imported inputs, while the other half
is the result of increased foreign ownership in combination with foreign rms being better at
using imports. These ndings show both that imports contributed substantially to economic
growth in Hungary, and the large aggregate eect of the complementarity between foreign
presence and importing.
In our second application we use simulations in the estimated economy to explore the
productivity implications of tari policies. Intuitively, a tari cut, by reducing the cost of and
increasing access to foreign inputs, should raise both rm-level and aggregate productivity.
Our main result is that the size of the aggregate productivity gain depends on two key
features of the environment: (1) the initial import participation of producers; (2) the degree
of foreign presence. Perhaps surprisingly, a higher initial import participation|more rms
importing more kinds of products|implies larger gains from a tari cut. This is because
the set of inputs whose costs are aected is larger, and hence rms save more with the tari
cut. This logic also implies that the productivity eect of tari cuts is convex: larger cuts
have a more-than-proportional eect because they also increase the set of imported goods.
In turn, foreign presence matters because, as we have shown, foreign-owned rms are better
in using imports.
These patterns lead to complementarities between dierent liberalization policies. For
example, our simulations show that tari cuts increase productivity more when the xed
costs of importing|such as licensing or other non-tari-barriers|are also reduced. Intu-
itively, a lower xed cost makes a larger set of goods available, expending the scope for
cost-savings from the tari cut. Because foreign rms are more eective in using imports,
a similar complementarity exists between tari cuts and FDI liberalization. While a careful
analysis of other economies is beyond the scope of this paper, these complementarities seem
broadly consistent with the liberalization experience in the early 1990s in India. Consistent
with the rst complementarity, tari cuts in India, which were accompanied by dismantling
substantial non-tari barriers, lead to rapid growth in new imported varieties (Goldberg et
al. 2009) and a large increase in rm productivity (Topalova and Khandelwal 2011). And
3consistent with the second complementarity, these eects were stronger in industries with
higher FDI liberalization (Topalova and Khandelwal 2011).
Our tari experiment also highlights the dierential policy implications of the quality and
imperfect substitution mechanisms. We show that the demand for domestic inputs is more
sensitive to taris when the benet of imports comes from quality dierences than when it
comes from imperfect substitution. This is intuitive: when foreign goods are close to perfect
substitutes, even a small price change can bring about large import substitution. Because our
estimates assign a signicant role to imperfect substitution, we obtain a relatively inelastic
demand curve for domestic inputs. In addition, losses to domestic input suppliers caused by
the tari cut are partially oset by increased demand for their products due to higher rm
productivity.4 One implication of these two forces is that redistributive losses due to import
substitution may not be very large in practice. A broader lesson from our counterfactual
analysis is that identifying the mechanism through which imports aect productivity helps
evaluate dierent trade policies.
Besides the papers cited above, we build on a growing empirical literature exploring rm
behavior in international markets, reviewed in Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2007).
Tybout (2003) summarizes earlier plant and rm level empirical work testing theories of
international trade. Our structural approach parallels Das, Roberts and Tybout (2007) who
study export subsidies, and Kasahara and Lapham (2008) who investigate the link between
exports and imports, by estimating optimizing models. Our basic theoretical framework
also builds on work by Ethier (1979) and Markusen (1989) who develop models connecting
imported inputs and productivity.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data and documents
stylized facts about importers in Hungary. Building on these facts, in Section 3 we develop
a simple model of importer-producers. Section 4 describes the estimation procedure and
results. In Section 5 we use these estimates to conduct counterfactual analysis. We discuss
some caveats with our approach in the concluding Section 6.
4This logic parallels Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) who argue that oshoring can sometimes|
surprisingly|increase domestic labor demand due to the increase in output.
42 Data
2.1 Data and sample denition
Our panel of essentially all Hungarian manufacturing rms during 1992-2003 is created by
merging trade and balance sheets data. Annual exports and imports for all rms, disaggre-
gated by products at the 6-digit Harmonized System (HS) level (5,200 product categories),
come from the Hungarian Customs Statistics. Because the 6-digit classication is noisy, we
aggregate the data to the 4-digit level (1,300 categories), and we use the terms \product"
and \good" to refer to a HS4 category in the rest of the paper.5 Firms' balance sheets
and prot and loss statements come from the Hungarian Tax Authority for 1992-1999, and
from the Hungarian Statistics Oce for 2000-2003. The data for 1992-1999 contain all rms
which are required to le a balance sheet with the tax authority, i.e., all but the smallest
companies|the main category of omitted rms are individual entrepreneurs without em-
ployees. The data for 2000-2003 includes all rms with at least 20 employees and a random
sample of rms with 5-20 employees. We thus lose some rms in 2000, which, however,
constitute a relatively small share of output: during 1992-1999, rms with no more than 20
workers were responsible for less than 7.5 percent of total sales. We classify a rm to be in
the manufacturing sector if it reports manufacturing as a primary activity for at least half
of its lifetime in the data, and exclude all other rms. We merge the trade data and the
balance sheet data using rms' tax identiers.
While our data contain product level information on imported input use, a limitation is
that we do not have corresponding product-level data for domestic input purchases, because
balance sheets only measure total spending on intermediate goods. We will rely on our struc-
tural model and on input-output tables to work around this data issue. A second limitation
is that we do not observe at the rm level import purchases from domestic wholesalers such
as export-import companies. We can, however, measure the role of such indirect imports for
the economy as a whole. We nd that the total value of intermediate imports by wholesalers
and retailers|as computed from our data|is about 2 percent of total intermediate input
use by all rms in all sectors of the Hungarian economy. This result suggests that the role of
intermediation is relatively small for intermediate goods, and due to lack of additional data
we ignore it below.
Processing trade. An important source of measurement error in our data is that some
rms engage in processing trade. In exchange for a fee, these rms import, process and
5Firms often switch their main export product at the 6-digit level; this happens infrequently at 4 digits.
5re-export intermediate goods which remain the property of a foreign party throughout. Be-
cause the processing rm does not own, purchase or sell the underlying goods, processing
trade is not recorded on the rm's balance sheet, even though it appears in our trade data.
This inconsistency creates measurement problems: in several observations, the value of im-
ported intermediate inputs, as measured by customs, exceeds total spending on intermediate
goods from the balance sheet. Similarly, exports measured in the customs data are often
substantially higher than exports from the balance sheet.
To deal with this reporting discrepancy, we measure processing trade performed by a rm
as the dierence between customs exports and balance sheet exports (when positive). We
classify a rm as \processer" in a given year if the ratio of processing trade to balance sheet
sales exceeds 2.5 percent, which is approximately the median across observations where this
ratio is positive. About 10 percent of our observations are classied as processers. To obtain
measures which re
ect the underlying economic activity rather than accounting rules, we
then adjust, for all rms, sales and total intermediate spending from the balance sheet by
adding our measure of processing trade.
Following these changes we create two data samples for our analysis. Our main sample is
dened by excluding all rm-year observations in which the rm is classied as a processer.
We also dene a rm-level sample which is obtained by fully excluding rms which are pro-
cessers for more than half of the years they are in our sample. The reason for the exclusions
is that our adjustment for processing likely introduces considerable noise.6 Because it has
more observations, unless otherwise noted we will use the main sample in our analysis. The
benet of the rm-level sample is that, because it does not permit changes in the set of
rms over time due to changes in processing activity, it better re
ects aggregate trends in
the data. After all exclusions, 130,027 observations remain in our main sample.
Input-output table. Besides the rm level data, we also make use of a sectoral input-
output table at the 2-digit International Standard Industrial Classication (ISIC, revision
3) for the year 2000, which comes from the Hungarian Statistics Oce.
2.2 Summary statistics and stylized facts
We document three basic facts about rms' import behavior in the data, which will guide
the specication of our formal model in Section 3.
6While we believe the exclusions are justied on prior grounds, keeping these rms in the sample and
including an indicator for processers in all empirical specications does not aect our qualitative results.






Employment  48.390 17.500 98.040
Sales (thousand USD)  2,908 392 6,952
Capital per worker (thousand USD)  12.990 10.700 16.660
Sales per worker (thousand USD)  49.410 35.340 72.030
Material share in output  0.662 0.636 0.705
Exporter indicator  0.351 0.149 0.675
Export share in output  0.108 0.047 0.205
Importer indicator  0.383
Import share in materials  0.105 0.274
Number of imported products 
(HS4)  4.660 12.160
Foreign owned  0.157 0.071 0.296
State owned  0.027 0.020 0.037
 
Number of observations  130,027 80,162 49,865
Number of firms  27,074 21,361 13,556
Notes: Tables entries are means unless otherwise noted. Column 1 is based on the full 
sample defined in Section 2.1. Column 2 is computed for firm-years in which the firm 
does not import, and column 3 is computed for firm-years in which the firm does 
import. The number of firms in columns 2 and 3 add up to more than the total number 
















Fact 1. There is substantial heterogeneity in the import patterns of rms. 61 percent of rms
do not import at all; larger and foreign-owned companies are more likely to be importers.
This fact can be seen by comparing across columns in Table 1, which presents summary
statistics for several key variables in our main sample separately for importing and non-
importing rms. Importers employ about 6 times as many workers and sell about 18 times
as much as non-importers. Using the classication that a rm is foreign-owned in a given
year if foreigners have majority ownership, importers are also more frequently foreign owned
and more likely to export.7 There is also substantial heterogeneity within importers in
the number of products they import. Regressing the log number of imported products on
log employment and foreign ownership shows that doubling rm size is associated with a
26 percent increase in the number of imported products, and, conditional on size, foreign
rms import 144 percent more products than domestic rms. The patterns shown here are
7Firm level evidence from other countries shows similar patterns: for example, Bernard, Jensen and Schott
(2009) document that \globally engaged rms" in the U.S. are superior along a number of dimensions.
7consistent with a model in which entry in import markets entails a xed cost. Larger or
more productive rms prot more from a given product and hence nd it easier to overcome
the xed cost. Similarly, foreign rms may have lower xed or variable costs of importing
and hence purchase more foreign varieties.
Fact 2. Import spending is concentrated on a few core products; rms spend little on their
remaining imports.
To document this fact, for each rm, we order imported products by the share of total
import spending allocated to them. Using this ranking, among rms importing ve or more
products, the average spending share (out of total import spending) of the highest-ranked
product is 54 percent. Thus, on average, rms spend more than half of their import budget
on a single product. In contrast, the average spending share of the fth-highest ranked
product is only 3.5 percent. This substantial heterogeneity across goods may be important
for evaluating the productivity gain from importing new products.
Fact 3. The extensive margin plays a large role in explaining both the aggregate trend and
the rm level 
uctuations in import growth.
Table 2, constructed from our rm-level sample, shows aggregate trends in rm imports
over time. It is instructive to look at average annual growth as well as growth over the entire
period of 1992-2003, reported in the last two rows. As column 3 shows, intermediate imports
in the manufacturing sector grew by 23.4 percent per year on average, resulting in a total
import growth of 657 percent between 1992 and 2003. On a year-to-year basis, almost 85
percent of import growth, 19.8 percent, is explained by the within-rm intensive margin, i.e.,
increased imports of goods that the rm was already importing in the previous year. Over the
entire decade, however, the role of the extensive margin is much larger: imports of rms that
did not import in 1992 and of products that were not imported in 1992 explain 84 percent
of the growth in imports 1992-2003. The extensive margin also has a large yearly gross
volume: on average, new importers and newly imported products contribute 10.8 percent,
while exit and the rm and the product level contribute -7.1 percent to import growth per
year.8 These patterns call for an explicit model of the extensive margin of imports, and|
given the high frequency of exit at both the rm and product level|suggest that imports
likely entail per-period xed costs.
8Due to the change in sample denition in 2000, we lose some importing rms in that year (see Section
2.1). These rms are also classied as stopping importers in the table. Because we only lose rms with 20
or fewer employees, the vast majority of which do not import, their eect on the volume-weighted numbers
in the table is likely to be small.
8Table 2: Import dynamics
         Contribution to import growth 














1992 1,717       
1993 2,036  18.6%  15.0% 15.5% 8.6% -14.7%  -5.8%
1994 2,758  35.4%  28.8% 8.7% 7.4% -4.6%  -4.8%
1995 3,503  27.0%  22.6% 5.9% 5.4% -2.9%  -4.0%
1996 4,676  33.5%  12.4% 6.8% 23.4% -4.3%  -4.8%
1997 6,291  34.6%  32.6% 2.9% 3.9% -2.0%  -2.8%
1998 8,728  38.7%  37.3% 1.5% 3.0% -0.8%  -2.2%
1999 11,272  29.1%  26.7% 2.7% 2.2% -1.1%  -1.3%
2000 14,622  29.7%  28.2% 11.0% 1.5% -9.8%  -1.1%
2001 18,199  24.5%  23.2% 1.4% 2.7% -2.1%  -0.7%
2002  17,218  -5.4% -2.2% 0.7% 1.0% -4.2% -0.8%
2003  15,759  -8.5% -7.3% 1.3% 0.9% -1.1% -2.4%
        
Average     23.4%  19.8% 5.3% 5.5% -4.3%  -2.8%
1992 to 2003     657.4%  152.9% 501.0% 54.3% -38.8%  -12.0%
Notes: Total imports are in millions of 1991 USD. Columns 4-8 measure the percent increase in imports 
attributable to different mechanisms and sum to column 3 in each year. The intensive margin measures the 
contribution of (net) growth in imports of products that the firm also imported the previous period (which in all 
rows but the last is the previous year, and in the last row is 1992). New importers are firms that did not import 
in the previous period. New products are newly imported products of existing importers. Stopping importers and 













3 A Model of Firm Imports and Productivity
Motivated by the above stylized facts, we build a model of a rm which uses both domestic
and imported intermediate goods for production. Section 4 will introduce the types of
heterogeneity across rms that we allow in estimating this model.
3.1 Setup











where K and L denote capital and labor used in production, Xi denotes intermediate com-
posite good i, and 
 is Hicks neutral total factor productivity (TFP). The Cobb-Douglas
9weight 
i measures the importance of good i for production. Motivated by Fact 2, we allow 
i


















where XiF and XiH are the quantity of foreign and domestic inputs, and  is the elasticity of
substitution. The prices of the domestic and foreign varieties are denoted piH and piF, and
by adjusting units, we set piH = 1. The price-adjusted quality of the foreign input is then
Ai = Bi=piF. Intuitively, Ai measures the advantage of a dollar spent on a foreign relative
to a domestic variety.
To aid the estimation, we make several assumptions about intermediate inputs. In prac-
tice some goods used for production are non-tradeable, and hence are not imported. To allow
for non-tradeables in a simple way, we assume that they coincide with the set of services,
and assign an innitely high foreign price and hence Ai = 0 to these inputs. Doing this
will allow us to estimate the input share of non-tradeables from an input-output table. We
also assume that the price-adjusted quality Ai of all tradeable goods used by the rm is the
same Ai = A > 0. This assumption greatly simplies our analysis and still allows us to
estimate the average quality advantage of imports.10 Finally, we order indices so that in-
puts 1;2:::;Ng represent tradeable goods, while the remaining Ng +1;:::;N inputs represent
non-tradeable services. We also order tradeable goods by their production weight, so that

1  
2  :::  
Ng.
Motivated by stylized fact 3, we assume that the rm must pay a xed cost F to access
foreign markets, and that importing each variety has an additional xed cost f which is
constant across products within a rm. To make the model consistent with the high frequency
of exit from import markets we assume that these costs are due every period.11
The rm sells its nal good in a monopolistically competitive market, facing a rm-
specic demand curve. For estimating the basic parameters, we require that the demand
curve is suciently downward-sloping so that the solution to the rm's prot-maximization
problem exists.12 To obtain estimates of the xed costs, and for the counterfactual analysis
9Hummels and Lugovskyy (2004) develop a related model where the marginal utility of additional varieties
declines.
10We do allow price-adjusted quality A to vary across rms by industry, ownership status and over time
in the estimation.
11In the estimation we also explore the case when F is a sunk cost.
12Denoting the (local) elasticity of demand by , this is the case when  +  + 
 < =(   1) holds
everywhere.
10of Section 5.2, we impose a parametric isoelastic demand curve.
Discussion. Our production specication incorporates both the quality and variety gains
from importing emphasized in the literature. Following Grossman and Helpman (1991), we
interpret quality as the advantage in services provided by a good relative to its cost. The
natural measure of the quality gain is therefore price-adjusted quality A, which can also be
interpreted as the eciency with which rms use imports, relative to domestic products, per
dollar of spending. Imperfect substitution, i.e., the idea that combining foreign and domestic
goods create gains that are greater than the sum of the parts, is measured by the elasticity of
substitution . For  nite, we always have a > logA: imperfect substitution amplies the
gain from a higher-quality foreign input. Our setup thus allows for 
exibility in the degree of
substitution as well as heterogeneity across inputs while maintaining the tractability of the
Cobb-Douglas model. As we show below, this framework also gets around a data limitation
by generating estimating equations for output and imports that involve only imported, but
not domestic product level input purchases.
Because we are primarily concerned with the importing behavior of a rm at a point in
time, the model introduced here is static. We make additional, standard, assumptions about
rm dynamics in Section 4.1 to aid the estimation of this model in panel data.
3.2 Firm behavior
To characterize rm behavior, we rst compute the cost-saving when the rm uses also
imports for a particular composite good. Given the normalization that the domestic price of
all inputs is piH = 1, the eective price of a composite good Xi is Pi = 1 if the rm only uses
the domestic input XiH. If the foreign input is also used, the eective price can be found by










using the notation that Ai = Bi=piF and our assumption that Ai = A for all tradeable
imported inputs. The (log) percentage reduction in the cost of the composite good i when







Parameter a measures the per-product import gain and hence is of central interest to us.
Note that a incorporates the cost-savings created by both the quality and the imperfect-
substitution channels: in particular, it is increasing in the price-adjusted quality A and
decreasing in the degree of substitution . Because of imperfect substitution, for nite  the
11rm uses both domestic and foreign inputs, so that the optimal expenditure share of the




satises 0 < s < 1.
We next characterize the choice of which varieties to import. In this decision, the rm
trades o the savings in marginal cost from using imports against the xed costs of importing.
Since the xed cost f and the per-product gain a are the same across products, a rm which
imports n products will choose to import those with the highest 
 weight, i.e., products
i = 1;:::;n. Let (n;F;f) denote prots if the rm imports these n goods given cost




It is easy to see that n is weakly decreasing in f and F: rms with lower xed costs import
a greater number of varieties.
Once the rm sets n, the relative importance of imported inputs for production can be
measured as the Cobb-Douglas share of composite goods which use imports relative to all


















g  0, the G() function is increasing and concave. Because the
denominator includes the weights of both goods and non-traded services, the maximum of
G(), denoted  G = G(Ng), equals the share of tradable goods in all intermediate inputs.
We now use G(n) to connect the number of imported inputs to import demand and rm
output. These two equations will form the basis for our empirical analysis. Denoting total
expenditure on intermediate inputs by M =
P
i PiXi and total expenditure on foreign inputs
by MF =
PN










where s, dened in (5), is the optimal expenditure share of imports within a composite good
i. This equation links the import share to the number of imported varieties n. Intuitively,
13For notational simplicity we suppress the dependence of  on other rm level variables such as k or !.
The prot function can be calculated using the demand curve for the rm's product, and we compute it
explicitly in Appendix A for isoelastic demand.
12rms that import a greater number of products n have a larger share of foreign goods in
total intermediate spending. This eect is captured by G(n) because the Cobb-Douglas
production function implies that the input share of each imported variety i equals s
i=
.
For an optimizing rm, the following expression|proved in Appendix A|expresses total
output with the number of imported varieties:
y = k + l + 
m + a
G(n) + ! (9)
where the lowercase variables y, k, l, m and ! denote logs. This equation has the form
of a standard production function: the rst three terms on the right-hand side measure
the contribution of capital, labor and intermediate inputs to total output, while the nal
term is the Hicks-neutral productivity shifter !. The novelty lies in the fourth term, which
represents the contribution of imports. The intuition for this term is straightforward: a
rm which chooses to import n varieties will have a percentage cost reduction of a on the
associated composite inputs, the total weight of which is
Pn
i=1 
i. This cost reduction maps
into a corresponding increase in output for a given total spending on intermediate inputs.
A natural interpretation of equation (9) is that a rm's total factor productivity is given
by  = a
G(n) + !, i.e., the sum of the productivity gains from importing and a \residual
productivity" term. This interpretation is correct in the sense that variation in  measures
dierences in output for the same amount of resources employed in the production process;
but it ignores the fact that importing also entails xed costs which require resources. Thus 
is an (approximately) correct measure of productivity holding xed all resources only when
the xed costs are small relative to the overall productivity gain, which|because importing
reduces marginal costs but requires the payment of xed costs|is more likely to be the case
for larger rms who import multiple dierent products.14 In the empirical analysis, we will
compute an adjusted measure of productivity which also re
ects the xed costs of importing,
and show that|because the bulk of production and importing is performed by mid-sized
and large importers|the two measures generate essentially identical aggregate predictions.
Hence in practice little is lost by treating  as a measure of productivity, which is what we
do below.
14More precisely, for the last product the rm chooses to import, the xed cost should be approximately
the same as the savings induced by importing that product. For every other|inframarginal|product that
the rm chooses to import, the xed cost of importing is strictly lower than the cost-saving from lower
marginal costs, and this dierence is increasing in rm size because larger rms gain more from a given
reduction in marginal cost.
134 Estimation and Results
We now turn to estimating the model in rm level data. Section 4.1 develops our empirical
strategy and Section 4.2 presents the results.
4.1 Empirical strategy
Assumptions about rms and products. Our theoretical model is static and applies to a
single rm. We now state assumptions about heterogeneity and dynamics which allow us to
estimate this model in panel data.
Our empirical strategy assumes that rms can be partitioned into dierent groups|for
example by industry or ownership status|such that certain model parameters are identical
within a group, but can potentially dier between groups. The basic parameters , , 
i, A
and  are always held constant within a group, and we also make|standard|homogeneity
assumptions about dynamics to ensure that the Olley-Pakes procedure yields consistent
estimates within each group. Specically, we write !jt = !obs
jt + "jt for a rm j in period
t, where !obs
jt is observable to the rm at the beginning of period t and "jt is a mean-zero
innovation, independent of other rm variables and identically distributed across rms in a
group and over time. We assume that investment Ijt, which is set before "jt is realized, can
be written as Ijt = (!obs
jt ;zjt) where zjt is a vector of observable rm state variables which
always includes capital kjt and calendar time t, and the  function is the same across rms in
a group and is strictly increasing in its rst argument. In addition, !obs follows a rst-order
Markov process with the same dynamics across rms in a group. These assumptions are
common in the productivity literature. We also assume that the xed costs Fjt and fjt are
drawn after the investment decision is made, independently across rms and over time, from
a distribution that may depend on zjt and !obs
jt .
This framework allows for considerable heterogeneity within a group: rms can dier in
their productivity, factor use, foreign and domestic intermediate input use, and also in their
realized xed costs. We also permit heterogeneity across products through the 
i parameters.
The requirement that the 
i|essentially, the G() function| are the same within a group
means that additional varieties decline in importance identically across companies, so that
all rms in a group have the same production structure. Importantly, it does not mean that
rms use the same goods in production, or that goods have the same production weight. For
example, 
1, the share of the most important input, is the same for all rms; but this share
can be dierent from 
2, and also, the identity of the most important good can vary across
rms.
14Estimating equations. We now use our assumptions to convert the production function
(9) and the import demand equation (8) into estimable forms by substituting out G(n) and
the productivity term !obs. Because the shape of G() is unknown, we approximate it with
an exponential function G(n) =  G[1   exp( n)] whose parameters  G < 1 and  > 0 we
estimate.15 To control for the productivity shifter !obs, we follow Olley and Pakes (1996)




with an unknown h \control" function, which is the same across all rms in a group.16
Substituting the expressions for G() and !obs into (9) yields our rst estimating equation
yjt =   kjt +   ljt + 
  mjt +   [1   exp( njt)] + h(Ijt;kjt) + "jt; (10)
where  = a
  G, and given our assumptions, "jt is independent of all variables on the right
hand side.





= s   G  [1   exp( njt)] + ujt: (11)
Because the model implies this relationship exactly, without an error term, we assume that
ujt is classical measurement error orthogonal to the decision to enter import markets and
hence the number of imported inputs n.
Estimation. We now outline our empirical strategy and then explain the logic of identi-
cation. Technical details are relegated to Appendix B. Estimation proceeds in two steps.
First we estimate (10) and (11) jointly using nonlinear least squares, which, given our struc-
tural assumptions, can also be thought of as a generalized method of moments estimation.
To do this we nonparametrically estimate the unknown control function h() separately for
each year as a third-order polynomial of z and investment, in which we also include a full
set of 22 2-digit ISIC industry indicators.17 Given the identifying assumptions that " and u
15In contrast to our assumptions about G(n), this functional form, which asymptotes to  G as n grows
without bound, has no maximum. Our implicit assumption, which is supported by our estimates, is that Ng
is large enough that the dierence between  G and G(Ng) is negligible. We obtained similar empirical results
when we experimented with other functional forms for G(n) including splines.
16Because z always includes calendar time, in eect we have a separate h function by year.
17 In our main specications we do not include nonlinear functions of the industry indicators because, in
combination with the 12 year indicators, they would in eect create 264 groups|many of them small|for
which a separate control function needs to be estimated, reducing power. Instead, below we report separate
15are orthogonal to the right hand side variables, we obtain consistent estimates for , 
, ,
 and s. We then compute a  G = =
. To separately identify a and  G, we note that 1    G
should equal the expenditure share of services in total spending on intermediates, which we
compute directly from a manufacturing input-output table.18 The second step is to estimate
the coecients of state variables z such as capital, which we do the same way as Olley and
Pakes.
Identication. The diculty in estimating the production function (9) predicted by the
model is that ! is potentially correlated with all variables on the right hand side, including
G(n). For example, more productive rms tend to import more kinds of products. By
estimating (10) instead of (9), we substitute out productivity using structural assumptions
in the spirit of Olley and Pakes. The identication of the import demand equation also
follows from structural assumptions, which restrict the functional form on the right-hand
side of (11). To see how natural threats to identication are resolved, consider the concern
that more productive rms both spend more on imports and import a greater number of
varieties, which could introduce spurious correlation between the left hand side and G(n) in
(11). Importantly, our estimation is immune to this concern: productivity, which is explicitly
incorporated in the model, cancels out of (11) because the left hand side is the share of
imports in intermediate spending. While more productive rms do import more, they also
spend more on intermediate goods, and given the homogenous production function, TFP
drops out when we compute the ratio of these quantities. In fact, our structural assumptions
yield a version of (11) which holds exactly, with no error term|this is why, given our model,
u should be interpreted as classical measurement error.
It is useful to understand the variation which identies our key parameters. Since we
jointly estimate (10) and (11), the form of G(n) is determined as the shape traced out by
the import share and by output when n varies, controlling for rm productivity. Once we
have this shape, a and s are estimated from the coecients of G(n), and are thus identied
from variation in n given controls. In eect, we are comparing the output of two equally
productive rms who import a dierent number of varieties. In the model, such variation
in n comes from the xed cost f, which aects the optimal number of imported inputs.
This step requires that the distributions of f and F have enough variation so that n is not
spanned by our set of controls, which clearly holds in the data.
estimates for several large industries, in which all parameters, including the control function, can dier across
industries.
18When we later explore industry level estimates, we compute the service share separately by industry.
16As with all structural estimation, the validity of our identication is guaranteed only if
the model is correctly specied. One important possible misspecication is that rms might
dier in their eciency of import use A. Such variation can generate heterogeneity in s and a,
which in turn can create correlation between u and G(n). We incorporate such heterogeneity
in our empirical strategy by allowing dierent groups of rms to have a dierent A.
Recovering deep parameters. Once a and s are estimated, we recover the deep parameters
A and  which govern the strength of the quality and imperfect substitution channels. The
basic idea is that a high a combined with a low s shows the importance of imperfect sub-
stitution: even though imports are attractive (high a), the rm still uses a substantial share
of domestic inputs (low s), indicating that mixing the two inputs is essential. Formally, we
solve for A and  from the following equations implied by the model:








The rst equation states that import demand s is positively related to both the gains from
importing a and the degree of substitution    1. Intuitively, a given gain from imports a
maps into higher import demand when the elasticity is larger because importers are more
willing to switch to foreign goods when they are good substitutes.19 Because we have both s
and a, this equation can be used to compute . The second equation (13) can then be used
to back out the quality eect A. Here the intuition is that the dierence between the quality
eect lnA and the total gain from imports a is a re
ection of imperfect substitution, which
in turn is related to the import share s by the rst equation.20
Consistency and standard errors. Our approach can be viewed as a GMM estimation and
hence yields consistent estimates under our identifying assumptions. We obtain standard
errors for all estimates from a bootstrap described in Appendix B.
Fixed costs. Finally we obtain measures, using some additional assumptions, for the
xed costs of importing. The idea is to invert equation (6), which expresses the optimal
number of imported varieties n as a function of f and F. Implementing this idea raises two
conceptual issues. First, a rm's choice of n depends not just on the import costs but also
on the demand curve it faces. To make inference possible, we therefore assume that each
19This intuition is slightly imprecise because a re
ects both the quality and the imperfect substitution
eects.
20Our approach here parallels Feenstra (1994) and Broda and Weinstein (2006). They express the pro-
ductivity (welfare) gain from variety as x1=(1 ), where x < 1 is the new expenditure share of old varieties.
In our model, xi = 1   s and the productivity gain is exp(a) = (1   s)1=(1 ).
17rm j faces an isoelastic demand curve Yjt = Otp
 
jt , where we set  = 5, which is in the
range of estimates reported by Broda and Weinstein (2006), and the demand shifter Ot is
chosen so that we match total annual industry output in the data. Then equation (6) yields
an explicit expression for n as a function of the xed costs.
The second conceptual issue is that, because n is a discrete variable, it does not pin down
the exact values of f and F. To deal with this problem, we rst use (6) and the choice of n
to compute, for each importer, upper and lower bounds for f and an upper bound for F. We
then make additional assumptions to parametrically estimate the probability distribution of
the costs. We assume that logf is normally distributed with constant variance and a mean
which depends linearly on zjt and !obs
jt , and we regress the log lower bound of f on these
variables to obtain the coecients.21 We also assume that logF is normal with group-specic
mean and variance, and compute these parameters by matching the share of importers as well
as the mean dierence in log output between importers and non-importers in each group.22
Intuitively, higher xed costs yield a lower share of importers, and higher dispersion in costs
yields a smaller dierence between the size of importers and non-importers.
4.2 Results
Table 3 summarizes our basic results. Because the dependent variable in the production
function is log total sales, not value added, the coecients of capital and labor are smaller
than in the more common value-added specications, while material costs have a large co-
ecient. All columns include year and 2-digit ISIC industry xed eects (of which there
are 22) so that our parameters are identied from within year and within industry variation
across rms.
Column 1 reports the results from our empirical procedure in a baseline specication.23
We estimate a highly signicant per product import gain a of 0:174. This point estimate
implies that the composite of the foreign and the domestic good is about exp(:174) 1 = 19
percent more ecient per dollar spent than the domestic good in itself. The share of non-
21Because the bounds we obtain are tight, estimating the regression using the upper bounds yields essen-
tially identical results.
22Armenter and Koren (2009) calibrate the xed costs of exporting the same way.
23Besides the year and industry eects, the control function h() used to take out unobserved productivity
also contains third-order polynomials of investment and capital, estimated separately for each year and
separately for domestic and foreign rms who might face dierent markets and hence a dierent investment
decision. We also estimated specications with separate control functions for the 22 2-digit industries (not
reported) and obtained similar results.












Dep. Var.: log sales  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
0.029 0.029  0.031  0.023  Capital (α) 
(0.003) (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
0.200 0.200  0.199  0.202  Labor (β)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
0.788 0.784  0.782  0.791  Materials (γ)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
0.174 0.123  0.057  0.146  Per-product import gain (a)  (0.046) (0.038)  (0.03)  (0.037) 
0.666 0.674  0.674  0.670  Import share (s)  (0.108) (0.108)  (0.109)  (0.104) 
1.116 1.083  1.037  1.098  Efficiency of imports (A)  (0.077) (0.054)  (0.03)  (0.060) 
7.301 10.071  20.791  8.571  Elasticity of substitution (θ)  [5.56;14.26] [7.11;22.61] [11.12;478.91] [6.55;14.33] 
0.020 0.019  0.019  0.020  Curvature of G(n) (λ)  (0.007) (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
0.039 0.034  0.041  0.046  Foreign ownership  (0.011) (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.008) 
  0.044 0.045   
Exporter 
  (0.004) (0.004)   
   0.012   
Previous importer 
   (0.005)   
Industry indicators  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
        
P-value of test for A=1  0.008  0.008  0.008  0.004 
Olley-Pakes control function          







As column 1 
and exporter 
status 




        
Observations 130,027  130,027  130,027  130,027 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by firm are in parenthesis. For the elasticity of substitution (θ) 
we report a 95 percent confidence interval computed the same way in brackets. Columns 1-3 use the structural 
estimation procedure of Section 4.1 and column 4 is estimated from nonlinear least-squares. Industry indicators 
are 2-digit ISIC fixed effects. See Sections 4.1-4.2 and Appendix B for details. 
 
 
  19service inputs among all intermediate inputs from the input-output table is  G = 0:825, and
in column 1 the elasticity of output to intermediate inputs is estimated to be 
 = 0:788.
Combining these numbers, we predict that if a non-importer starts importing all tradeable
varieties, it will experience an increase in log productivity of a  G
 = 0:113, or a productivity
gain of about 12 percent.
The table also reports our estimates of the structural parameters A and . In the baseline
specication, the price-adjusted quality of foreign products relative to their domestic coun-
terparts is A = 1:116, which is signicantly greater than one. Imported inputs are thus 12
percent better than domestic per dollar of expenditure, and this dierence in price-adjusted
quality accounts for about 61 percent of the per-product import gain. The remaining 39 per-
cent comes from imperfect substitution: we nd that the elasticity of substitution between
domestic and foreign goods is  = 7:3. The basic empirical fact underlying the importance
of imperfect substitution is that, in spite of the large gain from imports, the dierence in
the import share of rms who purchase more versus fewer foreign varieties is modest.
Column 2 re-estimates the model adding an indicator for export market participation
in the production function. The reason is to distinguish the eect of imports from the
\international engagement" of the rm, and to control for linkages between importing and
exporting such as those emphasized by Kasahara and Lapham (2008). The control function
in the Olley-Pakes procedure is now separately estimated by exporting status each year. The
import estimates are slightly smaller but similar to the previous specication, suggesting that
our procedure succeeds in isolating the impact of imports on productivity. Column 3 explores
the possibility that entering import markets entails a sunk, rather than a xed cost. When
F is sunk, the past importing status of the rm becomes a state variable, which should
therefore be included both in the regression and in the control function. The estimates are
now smaller, but the per product import gain is still signicantly dierent from zero, and
the results are qualitatively similar to our baseline. Taken together, these results show that
imports have a signicant productivity eect across specications.
A robust nding in columns 1-3 of the Table is that imperfect substitution is responsible
for 35 40 percent of the gains from importing. This result is consistent with the conclusions
of Goldberg et al. (2009) who show, in micro data from India, that rms combine foreign and
domestic varieties to increase their product scope: our results imply that combining these
inputs also raises productivity. Our empirical nding that imperfect substitution amplies
the eect of higher quality inputs (i.e., that a > logA) parallels theoretical arguments that
complementarities between inputs can generate large income dierences across countries. As
Jones (2011) explains: \high productivity in a rm requires a high level of performance along
20a large number of dimensions. Textile producers require raw materials, knitting machines,
a healthy and trained labor force, knowledge of how to produce, security, business licenses,
transportation networks, electricity, etc. These inputs enter in a complementary fashion,
in the sense that problems with any input can substantially reduce overall output. With-
out electricity or production knowledge or raw materials or security or business licenses,
production is likely to be severely curtailed." Our ndings provide support for the produc-
tivity eect of this sort of interdependence in the context of combining foreign and domestic
intermediate inputs.
Finally, column 4 reports the results from a specication which is the analogue of an OLS
regression for our setting, in which equations (9) and (11) are jointly estimated with nonlinear
least squares, but without using the Olley-Pakes procedure. Because this estimation does
not fully control for rms' endogenous choice of variable inputs, we expect the coecients of
labor and material to be upward biased due to the standard reverse causality problem which
plagues OLS estimates of productivity. In the table these coecients are almost identical
across columns, suggesting that the reverse causality bias is modest in practice. This result
is not uncommon in the literature; one possible explanation in our setting is that the year
and industry xed eects pick up a substantial part of the endogenous variation.
Foreign versus domestic rms. Foreign rms, dened as companies in which foreigners
have majority ownership, have played a very signicant role in the Hungarian economy. In
particular, in our data their sales share increased from 21 to 77 percent during 1992-2003.
Table 3, in which all specications include an indicator for foreign ownership, shows that
foreign companies are on average about 4 percent more productive than domestic ones,
suggesting that their growing participation has had signicant aggregate productivity eects
in Hungary. This observation raises the question of whether foreign rms are more productive
in part because the they use imports more eciently. Indeed, these rms may nd it easier
to locate low-cost input suppliers abroad, may have more extensive know-how about foreign
goods, and may face lower transactions costs.
To explore whether foreign-owned companies are more ecient in their import use, Table
4 reports estimates in which the price-adjusted quality of imports A is allowed to be dierent
across rms with dierent ownership status. Maintaining the assumption that rms use the
same technology, we restrict the elasticity of substitution  to be the same for the two groups.
The regression results in the rst specication show a large and signicant dierence in the
eciency of import use: we estimate A = 1:18 for foreign owned rms, while A = 0:95,
not signicantly dierent from one, for domestic rms. The large dierence in A maps into
a correspondingly large dierence in the log per-product import gain: we obtain a = 0:24
21Table 4: The gains from importing for foreign and domestic rms
Cross-section  Event study of change in ownership    
(1) (2) 








0.03 0.027  Capital (α) 
(0.003) (0.002) 
0.2 0.203  Labor (β)  (0.003) (0.004) 
0.788 0.784  Materials (γ)  (0.003) (0.003) 
0.116 0.241 0.126 0.125 0.191 0.288  Per-product import gain (a)  (0.024) (0.059) (0.035) (0.051) (0.059) (0.074) 
0.435 0.695  0.444 0.442  0.59 0.739  Import share (s)  (0.078) (0.089) (0.082) (0.088) (0.096) (0.092) 
0.949 1.182  0.953 0.952 1.081 1.25  Efficiency of imports (A)  (0.061) (0.095)  (0.074) (0.084) (0.095) (0.12) 
5.936 5.672  Elasticity of substitution (θ)  [4.64;9.50] [4.27;8.94] 
0.024 0.022  Curvature of G(n) (λ)  (0.008) (0.008) 
0.029 0.043  Foreign ownership  (0.013) (0.012) 
Industry indicators  yes yes 
Year effects  yes yes 
P-value of test for A=1  0.398 0.004 0.552 0.418 0.299 0.004 
P-value of test that A = 
previous column 
 0.004   0.972  0.099  0.016 
Olley-Pakes control function                




foreign ownership  Investment, capital, foreign ownership 
           
Observations  109,555 20,472  102,661 2,048  3,792  21,525 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by firm are in parenthesis. For the elasticity of substitution (θ) we 
report a 95 percent confidence interval in brackets. Both specifications are estimated with the structural 
procedure of Section 4.1. A different efficiency of imports (A) is estimated in specification (1) for foreign and 
domestic firms; and in specification (2) for always foreign firms, firms switching from domestic to foreign before 
the change, the same firms after the change, and always foreign firms. Industry indicators are 2-digit ISIC fixed 
effects. See Sections 4.1-4.2 and Appendix B for details. 
 
22for foreign and a = 0:12 for domestic companies. These results also imply that domestic
companies benet from imports primarily through imperfect substitution.
From a policy perspective it is important to understand whether foreign rms' greater ef-
ciency in import use A is caused by them being foreign owned, or is due to other mechanisms
such as selection, whereby foreign investors purchase rms which are better at using imports.
To explore this question, we look for changes in the eciency of import use in rms whose
ownership status changes during our sample period. Intuitively, if foreign owners selectively
purchase companies which are better at using imports, then the rm's A should remain the
same after the company changes ownership. In contrast, if foreign owners improve import
use because of lower transactions costs or other mechanisms, then we expect A to increase
after the company changes owners. Plausibly, this adjustment might occur slowly, over the
course of multiple years, because the company needs to learn the more ecient way of using
imports.
In the second specication of Table 4 we estimate a separate price-adjusted import quality
A for the following four groups of rms. (i) \Always domestic": rms who are not foreign-
owned at any point in the panel. (ii) \Before switching:" rms who are domestically owned
in the current year but whose ownership status will change at a later date in the sample.
(iii) \After switching:" the same rms in years following the change in ownership. (iv)
\Always foreign" rms who are foreign-owned throughout our data. The table shows that
switchers have A = 0:95 before the change|essentially identical to the estimate of A for
always domestic companies|which increases to A = 1:08 once they become foreign-owned.
The values of A before versus after the change in ownership are signicantly dierent at
a p-value of 9.9 percent. We also nd that the eciency of import use for always-foreign
companies is A = 1:25. Keeping in mind that we do not expect immediate full adjustment
under either hypothesis, and that the small sample size (there are 938 switcher rms in the
data) does not allow for a more precise estimate, we interpret our results from ownership
changes as strong suggestive evidence that foreign rms' greater eciency in import use is
at least partly caused by them being foreign-owned. This evidence for causality suggests a
potential policy complementarity between nancial and trade liberalization, which we explore
in greater detail in the next section.
Import eects by year and industry. To explore the robustness of our estimates and learn
more about the impact of foreign goods on the Hungarian economy, we next explore how
the gains from importing vary over time and across industries. Table 5 reports the eciency
of import use A estimated separately for foreign and domestic companies over three year
intervals. Consistent with our earlier ndings, throughout the sample period foreign rms
23Table 5: The gains from importing over time
 
Dep. Var.: log sales  1992-94 1995-97 1998-00 2001-03 
      
Efficiency of imports             
Domestic  firms  0.928 0.984 0.950 0.962 
  (0.071) (0.072) (0.078)  (0.09) 
Foreign  firms  1.052 1.320 1.198 1.151 
  (0.115) (0.164) (0.092) (0.107) 
Other parameters (common across periods)       
0.030  Capital (α) 
(0.002) 
0.200  Labor (β)  (0.003) 
0.788  Materials (γ)  (0.003) 
5.758  Elasticity of substitution 
(θ) [4.242;8.511] 
0.022  Curvature of G(n) (λ)  (0.007) 
Foreign ownership  0.029 
Industry indicators  (0.015) 
Year effects  yes 
      
P-value of domestic A=1  0.255  0.569  0.471  0.49 
P-value of domestic 
A=previous column 
 0.451  0.706  0.804 
P-value of foreign A=1  0.510  0.020  0.020  0.020 
P-value of foreign 
A=previous column 
 0.059  0.392  0.725 
Olley-Pakes control function          
Estimated separately:  By year 
Includes third-order 
polynomials of 
Investment, capital, foreign ownership 
      
Observations 130,027 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by firm are in parenthesis. For the 
elasticity of substitution (θ) we report a 95 percent confidence interval in brackets. 
A different efficiency of imports (A) is estimated for foreign and domestic firms in 
each 3-year period using the structural procedure of Section 4.1. Industry indicators 
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15  Food and beverages  19,441  1.304*** 0.935  3.568  3.100 
18 Apparel    5,259  0.489** 0.938  1.613**  6.670 
20 Wood  products    8,061  0.228** 0.810  1.220  8.270 
22 Printing  and  publishing  15,258  0.223*** 0.697  1.168***  6.350 
25  Rubber and plastics    7,534  0.194*** 0.724  1.156***  7.650 
26 Non-metallic  minerals    5,252  0.05*** 0.424  0.973  12.070 
28 Fabricated  metal  products  18,155  0.237*** 0.801  1.227**  7.790 
29 Machinery  14,203  0.124*** 0.465  0.973  6.070 
33 Instruments    5,339  0.28** 0.796  1.271*  6.660 
Notes: Table reports industry estimates of our baseline specification for industries with more than 5,000 observations. 
Significance levels (* at 10 percent, ** at 5 percent, *** at 1 percent) for the tests a=0 and A=1 are obtained from a 
bootstrap clustered by firm.  In each industry, the Olley-Pakes control function is estimated separately by year and 





















are better in using imports. The table also shows a large increase in the eciency of import
use between the 1992-94 and the 1995-97 period. This nding is consistent with the rapid
trade liberalization taking place in Hungary in the early 1990s, which reduced the eective
price of imports, increasing price-adjusted quality A. The 1992 Interim Agreement with the
European Economic Community phased out most taris|the import-weighted tari rate
declined from 7.8 percent in 1992 to 3.2 percent in 1996|and Hungary joined the Central
European Free Trade Agreement in 1992.
We also examine how the import eect varies by industry. Because dierent industries
might face dierent production possibilities and a dierent market structure, we re-estimate
our baseline specication separately for each of the 9 ISIC industries in which there are
more than 5,000 rm-year observations. We allow for dierent capital, labor and material
coecients as well as a dierent G(n) and dierent Olley-Pakes proxy functions for each
industry. Table 6 reports our estimates of the key model parameters by industry.24 Because
each industry has a smaller number of observations, the estimates are noisier, but the table
conrms the main patterns identied earlier. Imports have a signicantly positive produc-
tivity eect in all 9 industries; and imperfect substitution is responsible for 42 percent of
24Signicance levels are indicated by stars for the per-product import gain a and for the eciency of
imports A.
25these gains on average. The table also shows some interesting variation across industries.
The largest per-product import gain|over 130 percent|is in food and beverages, while the
smallest|about 5 percent|is in non-metallic minerals. Our estimates imply that the dier-
ence between these two industries is due to the combination of the two productivity channels:
imports are imperfectly substitutable and high-quality in the former industry, while they are
close substitutes and relatively low quality in the latter. It seems also intuitively plausible
that inputs in non-metallic minerals should be more substitutable then those in the food
industry. The industry results also highlight how deep parameters are determined by our
coecient estimates. For example, both the wood products industry and printing and pub-
lishing have a per-product import gain of about 22 percent; but because in wood products
the import share estimate is larger, our model implies a higher elasticity of substitution.
Intuitively, given the quality advantage of foreign goods, a higher import share must come
from greater substitutability.
Fixed costs. Table 7 reports summary statistics for the estimated xed cost distribution
both for the baseline specication of column 1 in Table 3, and for the rst specication in
Table 4 which distinguishes the eciency of import use for foreign and domestic rms. In all
cases, we nd that the median costs are low but dispersion across rms is high. For example,
in the baseline case while the typical rm pays an entry cost F of only $143, the mean entry
cost is a much higher $1,301, re
ecting the variance. Intuitively, our model explains the fact
that many mid-sized and large rms do not import by assigning a high xed cost to them,
pulling up both the variance and the average of F. When we distinguish rms by ownership,
we nd that foreign rms nd it cheaper to start importing: they typical foreign rm needs
to pay only $39 in contrast to the typical domestic rm which pays $158. For foreign rms,
surprisingly, we also estimate a higher median xed cost f ($892 versus $331). Although, as
we have shown in Fact 1, foreign rms import more kinds of products even conditional on
their size, our estimates imply that this is because they gain more from imports, not because
of lower average xed costs. Intuitively, given that they nd imports very productive (high
A), the only reason in our model why some foreign rms do not import a large number of
varieties is that they face a high per product cost.
Finally, we measure the eect on our productivity estimates of the xed costs of im-
porting. As we discussed in Section 3.2, a
G(n) is the proper measure of the productivity
gain from importing only when xed costs are ignored. To measure the quantitative im-
portance of xed import costs, we compute, in the baseline specication, the average of
F + nf among all importers, and obtain $10,173. In contrast, the average cost saving from
importing among all importers in our sample is $611,493. Thus the xed costs account for
26Table 7: Fixed costs
      Entry cost (F)  Per-product cost (f) 
      median  mean  log stdev  median  mean  log stdev 
Baseline     $143 $1,301 2.17 $443  $657  0.785
          
By ownership status  Domestic $158 $1,107 1.97 $331  $451  0.718
   Foreign $39 $671 2.38 $892  $1,617  1.082
Notes: Summary statistics implied by our estimates for the fixed costs of importing are reported in 1991 USD. 
Baseline refers to specification (1) in Table 3 and By ownership status refers to specification (1) of Table 4. See 
























only about 1.7 percent of the total cost savings created by imports, and as a result, ignoring
them does not signicantly alter the aggregate implications of our model. The reason for the
small contribution of xed costs is that much of the cost-saving from importing is realized
by mid-sized and large rms importing multiple varieties. For these rms the xed cost of
importing the rst few|most important|products is negligible relative to the large savings
obtained through the reduction in marginal cost.
5 Applications
This section develops two applications of our estimates. In Section 5.1 we quantify the
aggregate productivity eects of imports in Hungary, and in Section 5.2 we explore the
implications of tari policies in our estimated economy.
5.1 Decomposing the productivity gains in Hungary
To decompose the aggregate productivity gain in Hungary into various channels, we rst
write a rm's residual log productivity !jt = 1F
jt + jt. Here 1F
jt is an indicator for foreign
status,  is the Hicks-neutral mean log productivity premium of foreign rms, and jt mea-
















t denote the per product import gain for foreign and domestic rms in year
t and 1D
jt = 1   1F
jt is an indicator for domestic rms. Following Olley and Pakes (1996), we





where jt is the output share of rm j in year t. Denoting by  GD
t and  GF
t the sales-weighted
average of G(njt) and by D
t and F
t the sales share for domestic and foreign rms in year t,
simple algebra shows that the growth in aggregate productivity between time t and time 0
equals
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The ve terms on the right-hand side have the following intuitive interpretation. The rst
two terms measure the gains from growth in imports, created by an increase in the price-
adjusted quality of imports (rst term) and an increase in the number of varieties imported
(second term). The third term re
ects the greater aggregate eectiveness of using imports in
the economy, due to the increase in the share of foreign rms. Taken together, these terms
represent the productivity gains created by importing. The fourth term measures the direct
eect of increased foreign presence, caused by the higher average residual productivity of
foreign-owned rms . The nal term measures additional, non-import-related variation in
productivity.
We use the above expression to decompose productivity growth in Hungary. To smooth
out business-cycle 
uctuations and ensure a large number of observations, we use all rm-
year observations in the three-year range 1992-1994 as our \starting date" and similarly all
observations during 2001-03 as our \ending date," but interpret the results as a decompo-
sition for 1993-2002. We use the coecient estimates from Table 5 which is estimated in
our main sample, but, because our goal is to compute trends over time, we compute the de-
composition in the rm-level sample dened in Section 2.1. Specically, we calculate !jt for
each rm-year (of the rm-level sample) during 1992-94 as well as during 2001-03 from the
production function (9) and the coecients in Table 5. Similarly, we calculate the various
sales shares and averages of G(n) in the rm-level sample for all observations in 1992-94 as
well as 2001-03. The results are summarized in Table 8. Our numbers imply that total pro-
ductivity growth in the manufacturing sector in Hungary during this period was 15 percent.
28Table 8: Productivity growth in the Hungarian manufacturing sector 1993-2002
Growth in aggregate productivity  15.0%
  intensive margin of imports  0.9%
  extensive margin of imports  2.2%
  increased import by foreign firms  2.9%
  direct effect of foreign firms  1.4%
   other  7.6%
Notes: Total productivity growth between the periods 1992-94 and 
2001-03, interpreted as growth from 1993 to 2002, is decomposed 






















More than one-third of this growth, about 6 percent, can be attributed to various import-
related mechanisms. Increased imports generated a productivity gain of 3.1 percent, most
of which, 2.2 percent, comes from more rms importing more kinds of products. This result
conrms the quantitative signicance of the \new goods margin" also emphasized in the
context of product scope by Goldberg et al. (2009). The more ecient use of imports by an
increasingly foreign-owned manufacturing sector adds another 2.9 percent, highlighting the
substantial aggregate eect of the interaction between foreign capital and importing. These
large numbers indicate that imports were a signicant contributor to economic growth in
Hungary.25
5.2 Tari eects
Motivated by the large aggregate eects of importing, we now turn to explore how economic
policies aect import-related productivity gains. Our main focus is on the eect of tari
cuts. Intuitively, a reduction in taris can increase productivity by reducing the price of
imports and thereby increasing price-adjusted quality A, and also by increasing the number
of varieties the rm chooses to import. Our goal is to understand how the magnitude of these
gains depends on the economic environment and on other concurrent economic policies.
Model economy. We simulate tari cuts in a static partial equilibrium economy con-
structed based on the data and our estimates. Firms behave as in our theoretical model,
with technology parameters (in most experiments) given by the coecients in the rst spec-
25The remaining 9 percent of productivity growth is due to factors unrelated to importing. Higher foreign
presence, consistent with the empirical results of Brown, Earle and Telegdy (2006), had a substantial direct
eect by virtue of foreign rms being more productive; and we also nd a 7.6 percent increase caused by
forces outside our analysis.
29ication of Table 4. In particular, foreign rms dier from domestic rms in that they use
imports more eectively and that they have, on average, higher residual log productivity.
The population of rms in the model economy is the union of all rm-year observations in
our main sample. To model heterogeneity, we exogenously assign to each rm its actual
capital stock and foreign status from the data, as well as its !obs and " as predicted by the
regression coecients.
In the absence of point estimates, we randomly draw the xed importing costs f and F,
separately for foreign and domestic rms, from their estimated xed cost distributions (Table
7). Random assignment ensures that in the model economy the xed costs of non-importers
and importers are drawn from the same distribution. To solve for their optimal choices,
we also assume|as in the estimation of xed costs|that in the market for their nal good
rms face an isoelastic demand curve with price elasticity  = 5. All rms face the same
input prices, which we set exogenously to match aggregate output and input usage, and then
we let rms make their optimal decisions about labor, materials, imports, and the price of
their nal good. As we assumed when estimating the model, rms can only respond to the
observed component of productivity !obs = h(I;z), and not to " which aects only realized
output but none of the inputs.
In the counterfactual experiments we track aggregate outcomes as rms' optimal choices
change in response to changes in prices, xed costs, ownership status, and other parame-
ters. For simplicity and to highlight intuitions transparently, our experiments ignore general
equilibrium price eects.26 We also hold capital xed to avoid dynamic considerations. En-
dogenizing capital would likely amplify the eects we document for output and aggregate
productivity due to reallocation of capital to its most productive use.
Tari policy. We rst study the eects of a uniform input tari change of size , which
changes the price of all foreign inputs by a factor of (1+) relative to the benchmark economy
just dened. For example,  = 0 is our benchmark model, while  = 0:1 corresponds to a
tari increase of ten percentage points. In our partial equilibrium setting, the tari change
aects the economy by altering the price-adjusted import quality A of all rms.
Figure 1 plots changes in aggregate (log) productivity as a function of the tari change
in our simulated economy in three scenarios, which dier in the share of foreign rms in the
economy. In the benchmark scenario the same rms are foreign in our model as in the data,
while in the other two scenarios all rms are domestic respectively all rms are foreign. In
keeping with the construction of the model economy, when we change the ownership status
26 The partial equilibrium approach can also be justied if the policies we evaluate aect a small industry
in a small open economy.
30Figure 1: Eect of tari changes on aggregate productivity
of a rm, we change its eciency of using imports A, redraw its xed costs f and F from
the appropriate distribution, and adjust its Hicks neutral log productivity ! by the mean
dierence between rms in the two groups. We then compute the sales-weighted aggregate log
productivity dened in (14) for each value of , and|to measure the productivity change in
response to the tari policy|normalize this quantity separately in each scenario (by adding
a constant) to zero at the point of no tari change.
Two key lessons emerge from Figure 1. First, the fact that the curves are convex implies
that the gains in aggregate log productivity from a given tari cut are larger when the
initial tari is low, i.e., in a more open economy. Such \increasing returns" to tari cuts
may perhaps seem surprising, but the underlying intuition is straightforward. A marginal
reduction in taris increases productivity by reducing the cost of foreign inputs; and this cost
reduction is higher when more rms use more kinds of foreign inputs. Importantly, convexity
also implies that larger cuts have a more-than proportional eect on log productivity, because
they also increase the set of imported goods on which the associated cost-savings occur. The
second lesson of the Figure is that the gains from a tari cut are larger in an economy
with greater foreign presence. This follows because foreign rms are more eective in using
imports.
31Table 9: Counterfactual experiments
 
Panel A          
Tariff reduction  High fixed cost  Baseline  Low fixed cost 
40% to 30%  0.00%  0.00%  0.30% 
10% to 0%  0.10%  1.40%  3.50% 
     
Panel B          
Tariff reduction  No firms foreign Baseline  All firms foreign
40% to 30%  0.00%  0.00%  0.10% 
10% to 0%  0.80%  1.40%  2.70% 
Notes: Table reports changes in aggregate TFP in our simulated economy in response 
to a 10 percentage point tariff reduction under various scenarios. High fixed costs are 
3 times the baseline and low fixed costs are 1/3 of the baseline for each firm in the 

















To quantify the two forces identied by the Figure and explore their broader policy
implications, Table 9 computes the change in aggregate productivity that results from a 10
percentage point reduction in taris in several hypothetical scenarios. As above, a non-zero
tari  alters the values of A for both foreign and domestic rms relative to the benchmark
economy. Extending the intuition about the interaction between openness and tari cuts,
Panel A focuses on the combination of decreasing taris and changing the xed costs of
importing, such as those associated with import licensing. The three columns correspond to
environments which dier in the xed costs of importing. For each rm, we assign f and F
which are three times their baseline values for that rm in the high xed costs column, equal
to the baseline values in the middle column, and one-third of the baseline values in the low
xed costs column.27
Parallelling the larger productivity gain from liberalization when taris are lower, Table
9 shows a larger productivity gain when the xed costs are lower. For example, in the
rst row, a reduction in tari from 40 percent to 30 percent has essentially no productivity
eect when xed costs are at their baseline level because almost no rms are importing, but
does increase productivity by 0.3 percent in the low-xed-cost environment. Moreover, as
the second row shows, this complementarity between xed costs and tari cuts is stronger
when the economy is more open to start with: a tari cut from 10 percent to zero increases
27In the absence of direct evidence on how liberalization aects xed costs, our scenarios are motivated by
broad patterns in the World Bank's Doing Business survey. In the average OECD country, it takes 14 days
to start a new business and 11 days to import a standard containerized cargo. These time costs are about
three times as high, 45 days and 38 days, respectively, in Sub-Saharan Africa.
32productivity by 1.4 percent in the baseline, and by a much larger 3.5 percent in the low-
xed-cost environment. Taken together, these results highlight a policy complementarity
between reducing taris and reducing the xed costs of importing, and also show that this
complementarity is stronger in a more open economy with lower initial taris.
Panel B of Table 9 documents results about a similar policy complementarity between
tari cuts and FDI liberalization, particularly in open economies. The rst row shows that
a tari reduction from 40 percent to 30 percent has essentially no eect both in the case
when the economy has no foreign rms and when the composition of foreign and domestic
companies is as in our baseline. But, as the second row shows, the same 10 percentage point
tari cut in a more open economy generates productivity gains of 0.8 percent with no foreign
rms and 1.4 percent when the share of foreign rms is as in our baseline. Intuitively, in a
fairly closed economy the 10 percentage point tari cut does not make imports cheap enough
for either foreign or domestic rms, and is hence ineective. But in a more open economy,
the same tari cut reduces the cost of inputs that rms actually use, and hence increases
productivity. This eect is stronger in the presence of foreign rms, who are more productive
in using imports.
Our predictions about policy complementarities, which we obtained using only Hungar-
ian data, seem broadly consistent with the liberalization experience of the 1990s in India.
Consistent with the rst complementarity, tari cuts in India, which were accompanied by
dismantling substantial non-tari barriers, lead to rapid growth in new imported varieties
(Goldberg et al. 2009) and a large increase in rm productivity (Topalova and Khandel-
wal 2011). And consistent with the second complementarity, these eects were stronger in
industries with higher FDI liberalization (Topalova and Khandelwal 2011).
Import substitution. We next explore the eect of taris on the demand for domestic
intermediate goods. Our goal here is to contrast the implications of the quality and imperfect
substitution mechanisms, and hence for simplicity we perform the analysis in a model where
technological parameters are given by the estimates in column 1 of Table 3, so that foreign
and domestic rms use imports equally eciently. We analyze tari eects in the following
three scenarios. (1) Foreign and domestic goods are perfect substitutes: the benet of
importing is entirely due to price-adjusted quality. (2) Foreign and domestic goods have the
same price-adjusted quality: the benet of imports is entirely due to imperfect substitution.
(3) About 39 percent of the gains are caused by imperfect substitution, as in our baseline
estimate. We implement these scenarios by holding xed the per-product import gain a =
0:174 as in our estimate, and by adjusting A and  for the dierent scenarios. For instance,
in the rst scenario we set  = 100 which implies eectively perfect substitution, and let
33Figure 2: Eect of tari changes on domestic input demand
A = exp(a).
Figure 2 plots the change in the log dollar value of domestic input demand relative to
the baseline in response to a change in taris. Domestic input demand is more sensitive to
taris when the benet of imports comes from quality than when it comes from imperfect
substitution. This is intuitive: when foreign goods are close to perfect substitutes, even small
price changes can bring about large import substitution. Because our estimates assign a large
role to imperfect substitution, the middle curve, corresponding to the empirically estimated
composition of the two channels, is fairly 
at. This curve also re
ects the additional aect
that the losses caused by the tari cut are counteracted by increased demand for all inputs
created by the productivity gains from importing. One implication of these two forces is
that redistributive losses due to import substitution may not be very large in practice. A
broader lesson is that identifying the specic mechanism driving the eect of trade policies
is useful in that it helps evaluate the impact of these policies in other dimensions.
346 Conclusion
This paper explored the eect of imports on productivity by estimating a structural model of
importers in a panel of Hungarian rms. Perhaps the main caveat to our analysis is that, in
the absence of plausibly exogenous variation, identication requires us to use with full force
the restrictions imposed by our structural framework. This caveat may be weighted against
the benet that a formal model allows for counterfactual policy analysis. A potentially
interesting research area is to seek reduced-form evidence for our new predictions, such as
the complementarities between dierent liberalization policies, or the eects of taris on
domestic input demand.
A second important domain that our analysis neglects is the use of capital goods. Work
by Caselli and Wilson (2004) suggests that capital imports are potentially signicant because
of the technology embedded in them. Careful analysis of the productivity gains from capital
imports would further contribute to our understanding of the link between international
trade and economic growth.
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Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of equation (9). Given the Cobb-Douglas structure, total expenditure on interme-
















Taking logs and combining this equation with (3) with (1) yields





i + ! (16)
as desired. We can also compute the log of the total cost of the rm as
lnC =
1
 +  + 
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37Thus  = a
Pn
i=1 
i +! drives both the variation in output and the variation in costs across
rms.
Prots when demand is isoelastic. We write demand for the rm's product as
Y = OP   where O is a demand shifter and P is the price of the nal good, or, with
lowercase variables denoting logs,
y = o   p:
The rm charges a constant markup, hence the price is proportional to marginal cost. From
the production function, and holding capital xed, the (log) short-run marginal cost is
c0 +



















where c0 is a constant. It is easy to see that the ratio of prots to revenue is a constant
0 = 1   ( + 
)(1   1=). In turn log revenue equals




[! + k + a
G(n)]; (18)
where c(o;p;w) captures the eect of changes in prices and demand. Letting  = ( 1)=(+

), we can therefore write the gross prot of the rm, ignoring xed costs, as

G(k;!;n;c) = 0 expfc + [! + k + a
G(n)]g (19)
where c = c(o;p;w) is exogenous to the rm. We can use this prot function to (i) estimate
xed costs consistent with observed choices of n, and (ii) to determine counterfactual choices
of n. The prot function is increasing in n, at a decreasing rate for the baseline estimated
parametrization for G(n).
B Estimation and counterfactuals
B.1 Estimating the coecients
First step. For any given value of , the shape of the G(n) function is pinned down,
and hence our two equations (10) and (11) become linear and can be separately estimated.
Therefore we rst x  and estimate the equations separately, and then search for  to obtain
the best t.
We estimate (11) using OLS for a given , in which, to ensure that the estimates match the
total volume of import 
ows, we weight each observation jt by total intermediate expenditure
Mjt. We estimate (10) using the unknown h proxy function as follows. We regress all left-
38and right-hand-side variables of (10) on third-order polynomials of Ijt and zjt (with the
exception that industry indicators only enter linearly) to obtain a conditional expectation
E(xjtjIjt;zjt). Subtracting these conditional expectations from (10) and making use of the
fact that E(h(Ijt;zjt)jIjt;zjt) = h(Ijt;zjt), we can write the production function as
yjt E(yjtjIjt;zjt) = [ljt E(ljtjIjt;zjt)]+
[mjt E(mjtjIjt;zjt)]+fG(njt) E[G(njt)jIjt;zjt]g+"jt:
This equation can be estimated by OLS because "jt is orthogonal to all choice variables. We






Second step. The second step follows Olley and Pakes (1996) exactly. The coecients
of all state variables (capital, foreign ownership, exporter and past importer status) are
estimated in this step. We rst regress exit on a third-order polynomial of investment and
zjt using the same algorithm as in the rst stage. The predicted exit, ^ pit, together with past
productivity !i;t 1 can then provide sucient statistics about the bias in !it,
E(!jtjexitj;t+1 = 0;!j;t 1) =  (^ pjt;!j;t 1);
where   is an unknown function. Current productivity is a nonparametric function of past
productivity and the bias coming from endogenous exit. We approximate this function by
third-order polynomials.
We can rewrite the conditional expectation above as a regression equation,
!jt =  (^ pit;!j;t 1) + ejt
where ejt is a TFP innovation uncorrelated with past productivity and exit. As we do not
observe past productivity, we measure it as past output minus the combination of inputs,
^ !j;t 1()  yj;t 1   ^ lj;t 1   ^ 
mj;t 1   ^ a^ 
G(nj;t 1)   zj;t 1;
where  is the coecient vector of the state variables, in particular, it includes the capital










This estimate is consistent because ejt is orthogonal to all right-hand-side variables.
Because our estimation procedure can be viewed as a generalized method of moments, it
is consistent by Hansen (1982).
39B.2 Bootstrap to obtain standard errors and tests
We obtain standard errors, condence intervals and p-values from a bootstrap with 500
repetitions. We sample rms with replacement, holding their entire time path together so
as to preserve the joint distribution of variables at dierent points in time. This is akin to
clustering standard errors by rm.
Standard errors are obtained as the empirical standard deviation of the 500 estimates.
For the elasticity of substitution  we report 95 percent condence intervals. This is the
range between the 2.5th and 97.5th percentile of the empirical distribution of ^ .
We perform two-tailed tests for the hypothesis A = 1 as follows. If the estimate ^ A > 1,
we count the number of realizations in the bootstrap for which ^ A(i)  1 and report the
p-value of 2  n=500. Similarly, if ^ A < 1, the p-value is based on the number of estimates for
which ^ A(i)  1.
B.3 Estimating xed costs
We set the elasticity of demand  = 5. To work with the prot function (19), we also need
to specify c(o;p;w), which is exogenous to the rm. We do this separately in each year to
ensure that our model matches, given our coecient estimates and the demand elasticity,
total sales in the data. For any given value of c, for all rms in a given year we compute
their optimal sales using (18) given their observed k, ! and n, and then sum across rms.
We then search for the value of c which equates this measure of total sales with what we
observe in the data.
Given c, we estimate the xed costs as follows. If we observe a rm importing njt products
in year t, then

G(kjt;!jt;njt;c)  
G(kjt; ^ !jt;njt   1;c) + f
and

G(kjt; ^ !jt;njt;c)  t(kjt; ^ !jt;njt + 1)   f:
These inequalities yield lower and upper bounds for f computable given our estimates and
parameter choices which we denote f(kjt; ^ !jt;njt) and  f(kjt; ^ !jt;njt).
We assume that actual xed costs follow a lognormal distribution conditional on state
variables. We let the mean of logf depend linearly on capital, productivity, and foreign
ownership status as well as industry and year indicators: +bkjt+c!obs
jt +d1F
jt+xed eects.
We estimate , b, c, d and  from a regression of logf on these variables in the sample of
rms with njt  1 for whom the upper and lower bounds are close to one another.
40We assume that, for all rms within a group, F has log mean F and log standard
deviation F. We calibrate these parameters by matching two moments of the data: the
fraction of importing rms and the relative size (dierence in log output) of importers and
non-importers. A higher average xed cost lowers the fraction of rms who nd it protable
to enter the import market, and this monotonic relationship makes F easy to calibrate. To
calibrate dispersion F, we note that if F is small, rms have very similar xed costs, and
hence rm size is the main determinant of whether rms import. As a result, the output of
importers and non-importers will be very dierent. In contrast, if F is large, the decision
to import will depend mostly on the realization of F, and hence the output of importers and
non-importers will be similar.
B.4 Contribution of xed costs to productivity
To compute an upper bound for the average xed cost paid by importers in our data, we
rst calculate using our baseline specication, for each importer, the upper bound on the
per-product xed cost  f(kjt; ^ !jt;njt) as in Section B.3 and multiply it with the number of
imported products njt. The average of these upper bounds across importers is $9,987. To
this we add the average entry cost F across importers in the simulated economy. We use the
simulated economy because we only estimate the distribution of F but not its realizations.
Although the unconditional mean of F is $1,301, the majority rms with a high realization
do not import, leading to a mean F across importers of only $186. Overall average xed
costs of importing are therefore $10,173.
To compute the cost savings from importing, we compute in the baseline specication of
our simulated economy that if the average importer stopped importing, optimal production
of the same amount of output would require a $611,493 higher cost. From these numbers,
xed costs are only 1.7 percent of the cost saving due to imports.
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